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 1 
An Introduction to the 
Law & Economics of Information 
 
Tim Wu† 
 
Information is an extremely complex phenomenon not fully understood 
by any branch of learning, yet one of enormous importance to contemporary 
economics, science, and technology. (Gleick 2012, Pierce 1980).  Beginning 
from the 1970s, economists and legal scholars, relying on a simplified “public 
good” model of information, have constructed an impressively extensive body 
of scholarship devoted to the relationship between law and information.  The 
public good model tends to justify law, such as the intellectual property laws 
or various forms of securities regulation that seek to incentivize the 
production of information or its broader dissemination. 
 
 A review of the last several decades of scholarship based on the public 
choice model suggests the following two trends.  First, scholars have extended 
the public good model of information to an ever-increasing number of fields 
where law and information intersect.  An incomplete list of fields covered 
includes intellectual property, securities regulation, financial regulation, 
contract theory, financial regulation, consumer protection, communications, 
and the study of free speech.  While scholars in all of these fields are 
interested in information, they tend to focus on different market failures and 
different properties of information. Generally speaking, scholars of 
intellectual property have focused on problems of underproduction – the 
concern that, absent government intervention, less than optimal amounts of 
information will be produced.   In contrast, scholars in other fields, like 
securities regulation or consumer protection, analyze the dissemination of 
information, or “information asymmetries” -- failures to distribute 
information in an optimal fashion. 
 
 Second, over the last decade, scholars have sharply questioned the 
simplified model, and ask whether, in practice, information actually has the 
characteristics of a public good.   The public good model of information relies 
on two purported qualities: (1) that information tends to be difficult or 
impossible to exclude others from, and (2) that its consumption does not 
eliminate its value for others.   The first assumption, in particular, has 
undergone considerable attack; a closer look suggests that context, subject 
matter, and industry structure tends to yield great variation in how much 
intervention really is required to ensure adequate production or 
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dissemination.  This tends to support the existence of dynamic legal regimes 
attuned to differences in subject matter or perhaps industry structure.  
 
 The review closes by asking if the public good model, while well-
established, and relatively easy to understand, ought really be the exclusive 
focus of the economic and legal understanding of information.  The article 
closes by considering other, less investigated, but potentially important, 
properties of information that have not received as much scholarly attention. 
 
Information’s Peculiar Characteristics 
 
 Information is a complex abstraction that has been the subject of 
intense study by scientists and philosophers for more than a century.  It 
remains incompletely understood: some physicists, for example, believe that 
every particle and force in the universe might actually be best understood as 
a form of information. (Wheeler 1990). In the sciences, a minimal, though not 
uncontested definition of information defines it “as one or more statements or 
facts that are received by a human and that have some form of worth to the 
recipient.” (Losee 1998). 
 
 What are the economic properties of this abstraction?  Economists and 
legal scholars have generally been uninterested in the scientist’s concept of 
information, and instead more captivated by the premise that information is 
a “public good.”  Stated otherwise, the economic and legal scholarship has 
sought to analyze information as a member of a category of goods first 
described in modern times by John Stuart Mill (1848) as those that require 
public intervention to ensure an adequate supply of.   
 
If Mill did not invent the model, he certainly popularized it.   His most 
famous example of a public good was the lighthouse – something from which 
all benefited, but might be unwilling to pay for privately.   Other classic 
examples of public goods include a strong national defense, clean air, and so 
on, and Mill may have seeded the current treatment of information by 
describing knowledge as follows.  “The cultivation of speculative knowledge” 
wrote Mill, “though one of the most useful of all employments, is a service 
rendered to a community collectively, not individually, and one consequently 
for which it is, primâ facie, reasonable that the community collectively should 
pay.”  
 
In 1954, economist Paul Samuelson stated Mill’s idea more precisely 
by describing what he called a “collective consumption good.”  According to 
Samuelson, the category included those goods which “. . . all enjoy in common 
in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no 
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subtractions from any other individual's consumption of that good . . . .”1 In 
1962, Kenneth Arrow provided one of the first linkages between Samuelson’s 
concept and  intellectual property regimes, like patents, by which government 
intervenes in the market for information.2   And by the 1980s, it had become 
commonplace to link a public good model to government regimes that 
concerned themselves with information. 
 
Meanwhile, from the 1970s onward, the study of “information 
asymmetries” popularized by George Akerlof and others, has influenced and 
served as an important complement to the study of information production.3   
The study of asymmetries is essentially concerned with the distribution, as 
opposed to the creation of information.   The basic observation that a 
suboptimal distribution of information may yield a variety of problems (like 
adverse selection, moral hazard or worse) has influenced most of the writing 
described here. 
 
The Spread of the Public Good Model  
 
 Today, some version of the public good model of information now 
dominates analysis of the economics of information production. Among other 
fields, scholars have applied information-as-public-good arguments to fields 
as diverse as the regulation of securities, contract, consumer protection laws, 
communication laws, and constitutional law, among others.  However, as we 
shall see, there are important variations in how the arguments appear in 
different fields. 
 
 The use of public good arguments to justify grants of intellectual 
property has perhaps the longest lineage – one probably older than the public 
good model itself.   Consider Lord Macaulay’s famous 1841 argument that 
copyright is a “tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers,” 
justified because it is “desirable that we should have a supply of good books: 
we cannot have such a supply unless men of letters are liberally 
remunerated.”4    But the theory has spread far from its origins in intellectual 
property.   Since the 1980s, a public good theory of information has been used 
to justify mandating the disclosure of information for consumer or investor 
protection. “[B]ecause information has many characteristics of a public good,” 
                                                             
1 Id.; Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387 
(1954); Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 350 (1955). 
2 (“In the absence of special legal protection, the owner cannot . . . simply sell information on the 
open market. Any one purchaser can destroy the monopoly, since he can reproduce the information at little 
or no cost.”). 
3  The classic paper is George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics 488 (1970). 
4 Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), 
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wrote Jack Coffee in 1984, “securities research tends to be underprovided.”5  
The related concept of “informational” or “transparency” regulation such as 
hazard warnings, medical disclosure, and certain forms of campaign finance 
regulation has been justified using similar concepts.6 Daniel Farber has 
relied on public good arguments to explain or justify the American First 
Amendment’s protection of speech.  “[I]nformation is likely not only to be 
underproduced in the private market,” he writes, “but also to be insufficiently 
protected by the political system.”7   
 
 In each area, the key theory is that there is a market failure:  without 
state action, important information will either be underproduced, or too much 
will be kept secret from the public.  On closer examination, there are actually 
two different concerns here: underproduction and suboptimal distribution.  
These, as we shall see, can be more generally tied to two properties of 
information:  non-exclusion, and non-rivalry, respectively.  
 
Underproduction 
 
 John Stuart Mill’s original theory focused on non-exclusion.  As he 
wrote, “it is impossible that the ships at sea which are benefited by a 
lighthouse, should be made to pay a toll on the occasion of its use.”8  The idea 
is that if it is difficult or impossible to exclude non-payers from consuming 
the good in question, no one will have an incentive to provide the good, 
justifying public provisioning of the good.  Jefferson, writing before Mill in 
1813, opined similarly that an idea, once divulged, “forces itself into the 
possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.”9  In 
contemporary times, it is commonplace to describe information as 
“impossible” or “very difficult” to exclude anyone from.10 
                                                             
5 John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 
70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984). 
6 See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL , FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND 
PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 46 (2007); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An 
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 26 (media 
loopholes in campaign finance regulations) Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical 
Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1815 (1989) (chemical 
toxicity disclosure).  WESLEY A. MAGAT AND W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO 
REGULATION (REGULATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY) (1992). 
7 Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 554, 561 (1991). 
8 Mill, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., Book V, Chapter XI, Sec. 15.  See also 
Samuelson, Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, supra note 1, at 387. This point was famously challenged 
by Coase, who established that private lighthouses were funded by port fees. Ronald Coase, The 
Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974) (“We may conclude that economists should not use 
the lighthouse as an example of a service which could only be provided by the government.”). 
9  Letter to Isaac McPherson, Monticello, August 13 1813, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
326-338 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1904). 
10 E.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 42 (2003) (“[Ideas] are also assumed to be non-excludable (it is 
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 It makes sense that a concern about the underproduction of 
information ought depend on a concern about non-excludability.  The idea is 
that if the producer of information cannot exclude non-payers, he will lack 
the means to recoup his initial investment, hence eliminating any desire to 
create information in the first place.  If an author invests heavily in writing a 
book, and then lacks any mechanism to exclude non-payers, he will be unable 
to reap the proceeds of his investment later, and therefore will have no direct 
financial incentive to write books in the first place (though he might have 
indirect or personal incentives).  More realistically, we might say that if there 
is no mechanism for excluding non-payers, that publishers would be unlikely 
to invest in an author’s work, therefore making a career as an author difficult 
to support. 
 
 The key question, then is whether there is something about 
information that makes it impossible to exclude non-payers from consuming.  
A moment’s reflection makes it obvious that in most contexts this premise is 
cannot be right, at least in its strong form.   Consider the text of a book 
locked in a vault for which the key is lost:  we are all excluded from it.   If you 
don’t have a ticket, you won’t see that movie.   The information contained in 
an engraving written in a lost language, like hieroglyphs before the discovery 
of the Rosetta stone, is inaccessible to everyone. 
  
Two basic ideas from the basic science of information make it clear 
why the non-excludability assumption is hard to support.  First, information 
consists of patterns, which must subsist in some physical or electronic form -- 
ink on paper, stored magnetic charges, or whatever else.  Second, for a 
human to process information, that information must reach the brain (unlike, 
say, national defense, which can be consumed unknowingly), and be in a form 
that the brain can process.  These necessities combine to suggest one can 
exclude others from information. 
 
 Why, then, have so many thinkers insisted that information has the 
“property” of non-excludability?   What writers like Jefferson or Mill seem to 
have meant by non-excludability seems to be something meant at a high level 
of abstraction, really a property of knowledge or wisdom more than 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
impossible, or at least hard, to stop one unit of the good from satisfying an infinite number of users at zero 
marginal cost).”); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the 
Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 451 (2001) (“By labeling information a 
collective good in this Article, I do not mean to imply that it is literally impossible to exclude 
nonpurchasers, but rather the slightly weaker condition that such exclusion is extremely difficult.”); Peter 
S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 
1045, 1046 (1989) (“As [the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works] 
well recognized, the information comprising innovation in application programs is a prime example of a 
public good. Given the ease and low cost of copying application programs, it is often impossible to exclude 
nonpurchasers from an application program's benefits once it is commercially available. “). 
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information.   For example, one might be the beneficiary of the Christian 
injunction to “love thy neighbor as thyself” without ever hearing the phrase.  
Similarly, you might enjoy the comforts of air-conditioning without having 
read any of the original patents.   But this is different that being a property 
of information. 
 
Alternatively, sometimes what is meant by the “non-excludability” of 
information is really the idea that it is cheap to copy information.   Since the 
invention of the printing press, and especially since digitalization, copying 
information is usually far cheaper than creating valuable information.  This 
point can also be expressed by saying that information goods have a high 
initial and low marginal cost of production.   
 
 The fact that non-excludability is not some intrinsic quality of 
information, but a technological contingency is a challenge for the intellectual 
property laws. Stephen Breyer noticed as much in 1970, when he argued that 
copyright is hard to justify given the existence of alternative means of 
exclusion, such as the “lead time” enjoyed, in 1970, by the first publisher of a 
book.11  Breyer’s argument has been criticized for its technological naïveté 
(the piece presumed, for example, that software would be hard to copy), but 
the central insight seems correct; namely, when copying is expensive, the 
case for government intervention weakens.  That’s why, for example, the 
later Picasso never suffered from a lack of financial incentives to paint, 
because only he could create a Picasso.  The prospect of non-legal 
mechanisms of exclusion is what Chris Sprigman and Kal Rastiala rely on in 
their study of creative industries, like fashion, cooking, and stand-up comedy, 
which seem to prosper without intellectual property.12  In each, the industry 
devises its own means of exclusion, which seem good enough to incentivize 
production.  Eben Moglen argues that since non-market mechanisms yield 
sufficient information production, the actual effect of the creation of 
exclusionary rights in information is merely a giant wealth transfer from the 
proletariat to the bourgeoisie.13 
                                                             
11 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and 
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 299-302 (1970) (“A copying publisher, faced with the 
problems of ‘lead time’ and ‘retaliation’ is unlikely to see much profit in copying low-volume titles. It 
seems unlikely, for example, that a publisher thinking of copying the type of tradebook that now sells about 
4000 copies, would count on selling the 2000 or more copies needed to earn a profit.”). 
12 KAL RAUSTIALA AND CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION 
SPARKS INNOVATION (2012). 
13 Eben Moglen, The dotCommunist Manifesto, at 3-4 (2003), 
http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/dcm.pdf (“Creators of knowledge, technology, and culture 
discover that they no longer require the structure of production based on ownership and the structure of 
distribution based on coercion of payment. Association, and its anarchist model of propertyless production, 
makes possible the creation of free software, through which creators gain control of the technology of 
further production.”). See also Breyer, supra, note 11, at 289 (“We do not ordinarily create or modify 
property rights, nor even award compensation, solely on the basis of labor expended.”). 
 7 
 
 Nowadays most scholars hedge their bets by describing exclusion as 
partially non-excludable, “hard” to exclude people from, or by drawing a line 
between private and public information.14  Some scholars, like Christopher 
Yoo, Amy Kapczynski, and Talha Syed argue that non-excludability shouldn’t 
be considered a defining feature of information at all.  Yoo, writing in 2007, 
suggested that the costs of exclusion depend on the technological context of 
consumption, rather than the any inherent characteristic of information.15  
Hence, it may be very expensive to exclude the ships that benefit from a light 
house, but that is irrelevant to whether people without tickets may be kept 
out of a movie theater on opening night.  Consequently, Yoo argues that 
information should be understood an “impure” public good, yielding policy 
outcomes different than the pure public goods assumption.16  Kapczynski and 
Syed argue that excludability is “highly variable across information goods, 
and is affected not only by formal legal entitlements, but also by existing 
technologies for detecting or tracing such uses (and their costs); existing 
social norms regarding ‘acceptable’ or ‘reasonable’ enforcement efforts (in 
light of concerns about privacy, freedom of thought and speech, and so forth); 
and the existing institutions—or social roles, relations, and organizational 
forms—within which the predominant uses of the good will be made.”17   
 
 The weakness of the non-excludability assumption cannot be said to 
have destroyed the case for intellectual property or other forms of 
government action.    Defenders of the intellectual property regimes have 
attempted to justify intellectual property property by relying on several 
alternative theories. 
 
First, one might rely not on the assumption of non-excludability, but, 
as stated above, the empirical observation that it is, in today’s technological 
context, usually cheaper to copy information than create it in the first place.  
Whether low marginal costs of production are intrinsic to information, or 
                                                             
14 Yochai Benkler, in a typical example, writes, “Information is generally understood to be perfectly 
nonrival and partially nonexcludable.”  Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in 
Informational Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2066 (2000). 
15 Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. 
PA. L. REV. 635, 659 (2007) (“Indeed, it has long been recognized that exclusion is typically possible, with 
the costs of exclusion depending on the state of technology.”). Yoo attributes this point to Francis M. Bator, 
The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. Econ. 351, 370 (1958) (describing how nonappropriability can 
cause market failure). 
16 See Yoo, supra note 15. Yoo’s argument is more complex than captured by this sentence. More 
specifically, he believes that Samuelson’s theory of public goods does not depend on non-rivalry and non-
excludability, but rather, a condition whereby consumers consume the same quantity of the good and signal 
their preferences by prices, the inverse of the situation with private goods. Yoo believes that this 
incentivizes users of a public good to understate their true willingness to pay, in the hopes that others will 
bear the costs of creating that good. Id. at 670.  
17 Amy Kapczynski, Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 
YALE L.J. 1900, 1903 (2013). 
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simply a matter of technological context is an interesting one and not subject 
to easy answer.  In the days when monks copied bibles by hand, copying costs 
were perhaps comparable to the costs of creating the work in the first place.  
However, ever since the invention of the printing press, copying information 
has tended to be cheaper than producing it, which is an explanation for the 
appearance of the earliest copyright laws in that era. 
 
 In any event, the low marginal cost of production for informational 
goods creates a free-riding argument.  Represented in accounts by Tom 
Palmer, among others,18 the argument asserted that the production of 
information would naturally create, within groups, either problems of 
collective action or a “tragedy of the commons.”  Given an incentive to copy 
information and thereby free-ride on the production efforts of others, none 
will be incentivized to produce information, therefore yielding less production 
than might be ideal.  This argument depends not on the impossibility of 
excluding consumers, but the low costs of copying in certain contexts, as just 
discussed.19   
 
Second, some scholars justify the existence of government enforcement 
of intellectual property rights by stressing the costs of the alternatives.   The 
creators of information tend to regard it as theirs, and want to protect it.  
When private parties rely on private remedies, those remedies may 
themselves be quite socially expensive.  Consider that real property can be 
defended by its owners using fences and armed guards, yet government 
grants exclusion rights in land, whether to encourage investment, or to 
facilitate the development of markets.  In the Hobbesian sense, the legal 
system may be a less wasteful alternative to private exclusion schemes, for 
example, if it displaces expensive warfare between information-producers 
and their copiers.20 
 
 This scholarship tends to allude to the costs of “races” of various 
kinds, including “arms races” between copiers and creators.   “The existence 
of a cost-effective self-help remedy,” argues Douglas Lichtman, should not 
always preclude “government regulation as a means to accomplish similar 
ends.”21   In another example in the scholarship, Scott Hemphill and Jeannie 
Suk argue that in the fashion industry an inability to exclude copiers creates 
a reliance on “logoification.”  That, they argue, “pull[s] fashion toward a 
                                                             
18 Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 
HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 285 (1989); Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. 
& ECON. 265 (1977). See also Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 
(1999); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 697 (2001). 
19  Palmer, supra note 18 at 285. 
20 Lee Kovarsky, A Technological Theory of the Arms Race, 81 IND. L.J. 917 (2006). 
21 Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help (2004). 
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status-conferring function and away from the communication of diverse 
messages.”22   
 
Third, intellectual property has sometimes been separatly justified by 
what might be described as a Demsetzian theory.  The idea is that group use 
of a given resource, like information, will create externalities of various sorts 
that should be internalized by property rights.  For example, Ed Kitch in a 
famous 1977 paper argued that patent ought to give out broad “prospects” – 
that is, a patent covering the initial invention and subsequent inventions as 
well.  Otherwise, Kitch argued, the owner might lack incentives to make 
further investments in research beyond the initial invention in research for 
fear that the benefits will be appropriated by others. 
 
 Kitch’s idea has faced criticism too voluminous to summarize: Mark 
Lemley’s 2004 criticism is typical, and echoes earlier papers by Carol Rose, 
Wendy Gordon and others.23  Lemley, as in his other work, relies on the 
nature of information; it “cannot be depleted,” he wrote, and therefore is not 
subject to a tragedy of the commons or the negative externalities that justify 
real property rights.  Rather, by its very nature, the tendency was for the 
creation of information to throw off positive externalities – such as the 
example of the multiple beneficiaries of the invention of the steam engine.  
Compensation for positive externalities, or spillovers, Lemley argued in this 
and other works,24 should almost never be the subject of government 
intervention.  “If ‘free riding’ means merely obtaining a benefit from another’s 
investment, the law does not, cannot, and should not prohibit it.”25   
 
Fourth and finally, where the public good model doesn’t strongly 
justify intervention, it is certainly possible government may have entirely 
different goals in mind unrelated to the economics of information.   For 
example, a strong copyright or patent regime may be understood as a subsidy 
for the entertainment or pharmaceutical industries.  As such the law might 
really draw little justification from the economics of information, but rather 
                                                             
22 C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
1147 (2009). 
23 Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 129, 143 n. 52 (2004). Carol Rose wrote that the case for property rights is inherently weaker in what 
she labeled “intellectual space” because “there is no physical resource to be ruined by overuse. Books, 
tapes, and words may be copied, inventions may be imitated, pictures may be reproduced all without the 
slightest damage to the original.” Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of 
Public Property in the Information Age, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (2003). 
24 Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 299-300 (2007) 
(“Such intervention may be unnecessary and in fact may lead to welfare-reducing distortions.”). 
25 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1049 
(2005). See also Wendy Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary 
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 167 (1992) (“A culture could not exist if all free riding were prohibited 
within it.").   
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be better described as such be a form of industrial policy, or perhaps a 
component of a “strategic trade policy.”   Such laws might also be understood 
as a form of political patronage. 
 
 If nothing more, a generation of scholarship on the existence of private 
exclusion mechanisms should force any contemporary policy-maker to 
consider the comparative efficiency of private and public reward schemes for 
the production of information products, along with due consideration of the 
choice among public alternatives.  That point is central to Raustiala and 
Springman’s writings and also has led Steven Shavell, among others, to 
conclude that an optional reward would be more efficient than a pure patent 
system for incentivizing research.26   
 
  
Information Distribution Problems 
 
 Problems of information distribution, or “under-dissemination” form a 
problem distinct from under-production.  Here, the problem can be phrased 
ass follows.  Markets and other systems involving human decisions (like 
elections) require a certain amount of information to function well and may 
also require that the information be distributed symmetrically among buyers 
and sellers (or their equivalents).  Where information is scarce, or if 
distributed asymmetrically, systemic failure can be expected.  By metaphor, 
information may act like oil in an engine, and if insufficient, the engine may 
seize.  While some quantity of information is disseminated naturally, so to 
speak, the idea that natural sources will be inadequate tends to support some 
forms of public or private intervention to ensure enough information is 
disseminated to keep things running smoothly. 
 
 As described above, the problem of information distribution was a 
focused of the information asymmetry literature whose origins were in the 
the 1970s.  Among that literature’s first prominent area of legal relevance 
was the analysis of capital markets: in 1984, law professors Ronald J. Gilson 
and Reinier H. Kraakman theorized that the distribution of information was a 
key determinant of capital market efficiency.  Hence, institutions (like investment 
banks) capable of reducing the costs of obtaining information, and thereby making 
information more widespread, increased the efficiency of the capital markets.27   
Writing in the same year, Jack Coffee argued that the need for investors to 
have adequate information to make investment decisions justified the 
                                                             
26  Yochai Benkler, similarly, suggests that there may be alternative private models of producing 
valuable information that depend on what he terms “peer production” models. Yochai Benkler, THE 
WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006). 
27  Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 
549 (1984). 
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existence of regulations requiring disclosure of financial information.   The 
argument that a market needs information in order to function efficiently has 
also been used to justify the existence of quasi-private institutions like credit 
rating organizations.28 
 But capital markets are not the only systems that require adequate 
and well distributed information to function well.  Markets for consumer 
goods and services do as well, yielding theoretical support for interventions 
like consumer warnings, the publication of nutritional information, 29 or the 
consumer protection requirement that information on labels be generally 
accurate.30  In financial regulation, the market for money claims has been 
said to depend on the maintenance of symmetric ignorance.31    
Non-market systems, like the political system or elections, also require 
information to function well, which may justify various measures, such as the 
prohibition of political censorship in the First Amendment.32 
 
 The extent to the need for better distribution of information justifies 
government interventions depends on whether the private mechanisms of 
distribution are adequate.  This is a question which is very hard to answer in 
the abstract.  Gilson and Kraakman theorized that the “distribution of a 
particular piece of information is a function of its cost,” by which they meant 
the cost of acquiring it or perhaps of producing it.   They suggested that 
private mechanisms, like investment banks, might aid the distribution of 
information, but did not make clear when such mechanisms might be 
adequate.  It is also true that markets themselves are, as Thomas J. 
Fitzpatrick & Chris Sagers put it, “machines for generating information” and 
many financial economists have long supposed that markets generate enough 
information to generate accurate prices without much intervention.33  Other 
the other hand, it is obvious that there is much important information that 
one cannot expect to be widely distributed without any public intervention.    
Some might be simply too expensive to be worth producing (like census 
                                                             
28  See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry:An Industrial Organization Analysis, in 
RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 43-44 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 
2002), but see THOMAS J. FITZPATRICK, IV & CHRIS SAGERS, Faith Based Financial Regulation: A Primer 
On Oversight Of Credit Rating Organizations, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 557 (2009) (questioning whether CROs 
can be justified by information-production or disseminating role). 
29 See, e.g., Tom Valuck, Keeping Dietary Supplement Regulations Slim and Fit: Finding a Healthy 
Balance Between Paternalism and Consumer Choice, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 285, 305 (2004) (discussing 
the need for government intervention in the provision of information about dietary supplements). More 
broadly, see Magat & Viscusi, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
30  See, Fung, et. al, supra note 6; Magat & Viscusi, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; 
William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1771-72 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein,Informational Regulation and Informational 
Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (1999). 
31  See Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking (2016). 
32  See Farber, supra note 7. 
33  Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, IV & Chris Sagers, supra note28. 
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information), causing the public good problem described above.   For other 
forms of information, the parties who hold will have good reason to hide it.   
Companies might want to hide their true revenues and profits, or the fact 
that a product is defective or causes disease.  In these sort of situations 
scholars and government have suggested public action is necessary. 
 
 While the literature centered on information asymmetries and the 
previous discussion of underproduction are authored by different groups of 
scholars, a moments analysis reveals that they rely on the same conceptual 
framework, and ultimately the same observations about information itself. 
Asymmetries are typically assumed to result from some initial allocation of 
information that is expensive to overcome.  Another way to express the same 
point is to suggest that high information costs cause problems.34  If the 
marginal cost of disseminating information is low, anyone who values the 
information at even a fraction of a penny should have it; otherwise, there is 
deadweight loss.  The concern, therefore, is that the full value of information 
to the public, and in particular, to consumers of the information, will go 
unrealized.   
 
But what might make problems of distribution of information different 
than any other good or commodity?   The differences lies in the key concept of 
“non-rivalry,” which is the link between the information asymmetry 
literature and the public good scholarship.  The concept is simply that 
consumption of information does not reduce its utility for others.   Your 
reading of my book doesn’t “use it up,” the same way that eating my 
sandwich does.   This concept is expressed by economists in various ways, 
including the idea that information is “infinite in supply,” or experiences 
“jointness of consumption.” In mathematic models, non-rivalry is captured by 
the assumption of zero marginal cost of production.   
 
Perhaps reflecting its slightly mysterious quality, legal writers have 
often employed parables or analogies to capture the concept of non-rivalry.  
Mark Lemley writes, “if I give you a fish, I no longer have it, but if I teach 
you to fish, you or I can teach a hundred others the same skill without 
appreciably reducing its value.”35  The most famous parable is Thomas 
Jefferson’s analogy to fire and air.  “He who receives an idea from me, 
receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his 
taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.”  Therefore, ideas are 
                                                             
34 Brett M. Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143 (2009). 
35  Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 
989, 995 (1997). See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 12 (1994) (“A loaf of bread, once eaten, is gone. But ‘Oh, Pretty Woman,’ once sung 
and heard, is still available for someone else to sing and to hear. Countless fans can listen to the song, 
indeed copy it, without diminishing its availability to anyone else who wants to sing or listen to or copy 
it.”). 
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“like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any 
point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical 
being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.”  Jefferson took 
this to mean that private rights in ideas cannot be justified “[i]f nature has 
made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is 
the action of the thinking power called an idea.”36   
 
 Copyright’s fair use doctrine, while sometimes said to overcome 
failures of bargaining, has sometimes been justified by what is, on closer 
inspection, the solution to a distributional problem.  Provided the producer is 
unaffected, or not unduly affected, the non-rivalrous nature of information 
suggests the public should want others to use the information at a price 
approaching zero.  The famous Sony decision, which held legal the home 
taping of TV shows for later viewing, is easily viewed as the solution to an 
underuse problem.37  If the home taping did not actually deplete or affect the 
value of the television shows, there was no good reason not to allow it.  We 
might say the court set the price at zero. 
 
 The analogies to fish and fire notwithstanding, it is worth asking, as 
we did with non-excludability: does information actually have the 
characteristics of non-rivalry?  In its purest form, this concept would presume 
that one’s usage of information would no effect on another’s, that “a unit of 
the good can be consumed by one individual without detracting, in the 
slightest, from the consumption opportunities still available to others from 
that same unit.”38  To use a common example, it seems implausible that one 
person’s use of a stop sign would change that experience for someone else.   
 
 Some scholars seem to firmly believe that information’s non-rivalry is 
an incontestable, as a matter of physics rather than law or economics.  “The 
degree to which a good is or is not rivalrous is a fact of nature,” writes Yochai 
Benkler “a thing either does, or does not have this unusual attribute that, 
once produced, many can enjoy it without added cost.”39  But others argue 
that information, like private goods, might in fact sometimes be “overgrazed” 
or suffer from congestion, like a parcel of land or a highway.40  The 
trademark laws, which employ concepts like blurring, tarnishing, and 
dilution, seems to contemplate this possibility, and in a 2002 paper, Richard 
Posner and William Landes so asserted explicitly. 41  They argued that 
                                                             
36 Letter to Isaac McPherson, from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 9. 
37  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studio, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
38 RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB 
GOODS 8 (2d. ed. 1996). 
39 Benkler, Unhurried, supra note 14. 
40  See Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law, 85 
MINN L REV. 949, 975–82 (2001). 
41 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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excessive use of an image of Humphrey Bogart, for example, over time might 
cause “confusion, the tarnishing of the image, or sheer boredom … 
[e]ventually the image might become worthless.”42 Turning to the well-known 
character of Mickey Mouse, Posner and Landes argued that the character 
might similarly become over-grazed without proper management: “not only 
would the public rapidly tire of Mickey Mouse, but his image would be 
blurred, as some authors portrayed him as a Casanova, others as catmeat, 
others as an animal-rights advocate, still others as the henpecked husband of 
Minnie.”43   
 
 Posner and Landes’s assertion has gained a few adherents,44 but has 
also been subject to sharp criticism.45  Such congestion arguments, argued 
Mark Lemley, “misunderstand[] the nature of information,” which “cannot be 
depleted.” Christopher Yoo argues that the Posner & Landes argument is 
hard to sustain beyond the particular examples of celebrity images or 
characters, which have an unusual economics all of their own.  Yoo accepts 
the possibility of congestion, but notes that usage of information will not 
predictably decrease its value;46 moreover, if there are congestion 
externalities, says Yoo, they might be either technological or pecuniary; and 
if the latter, the policy implications become highly ambiguous.47 
 
 Examples make clear that congestion problems or overgrazing 
concerns are certainly not present for all forms of information.  (This is a 
point Landes and Posner concede by alluding to Shakespeare’s works which 
“seem undiminished by the proliferation of performances and derivative 
works, some of them kitsch.”)48  Strictly speaking, Landes and Posner were 
writing about copyrighted works, which are a subset of information, but 
consider a factual discovery like the circumference of the earth.  While clearly 
a form of valuable information, how it might get used up or tarnished is 
unclear.  Even if a central plot element in a bad romantic comedy, the 
number (40,075 km) would retain its value and remain useful to others.  
What does seem to be potentially subject to dilution or tarnishing is not the 
information itself, but something like the reputation attached to the 
information, which seems an analytically distinct category.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
471 (2003). 
42  Id. at 486. 
43 Id. at 488. 
44 David Barnes seeks to extend the concept as follows: “analytically, it is useful to distinguish 
between the simple ‘over-reproduction’ type of overuse that causes the public to tire of the image and 
‘transformative’ overuse that blurs the image.” David W. Barnes, Congestible Intellectual Property and 
Impure Public Goods, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 533 at ¶ 20 (2011).  
45 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 15; Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Pos, supra note 23. 
46 Yoo, supra note 15, at 683-87. 
47  Id. at 686. 
48 Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 488. 
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 The idea that underusage is a problem also depends on information 
actually being non-rivalous, or infinite in supply, not just as an ideal object, 
but as a market reality – how often is the information itself is actually the 
relevant good?  Thomas Nachbar argues that for many purposes it is other 
economic factors that policy should concern itself with.  “Intellectual works” 
he states, “do not exist except as the product of human labor, which is itself 
the subject of considerable rivalry.”49  For example, in the case International 
New Service v. Associated Press, as Nachbar explains, it may have been true 
that the information taken from one news service by another was a public 
good.  However, the court was, according to Nachbar, concerned not with the 
unusual properties of information, but competition for profit as between the 
two news services.  His point is that esoteric questions about the nature of 
information, such as those just considered at length here, can often be 
irrelevant for many markets. 
 
* * * 
 
 We can here summarize the current state of understanding.  
Information is widely agreed to have unusual properties as compared to 
physical resources, chief among which are some measure of non-rivalry, non-
exclusivity, and a low marginal cost of production.  These properties have 
been used both to justify specialized legal regimes designed either to 
overcome underproduction and asymmetry problems.  The extent of all of 
these properties is contested, both as a mater of theory and market reality, or 
said to be context-dependent.   
 
 This tends to suggest that the case for laws governing information is 
difficult to state generally, and may vary widely by industry, context, or the 
means of production involved.  While describing information as a public good 
provides a simple justification for government intervention, as Ronald Coase 
famously pointed out with respect to lighthouses, the reality is often far more 
complex (there were, in fact, private lighthouses).50  This lends support to the 
idea, for example, that the subject matter of copyright and patent might be 
better served by rules that are adjusted by an ongoing judicial process, rather 
than being subject to blanket rules.  In areas outside of intellectual property, 
it similarly suggests that regulators ought to pay careful attention to 
determine whether, in fact, the information they wish to see disclosed 
requires intervention, and how effectively consumers will really make use of 
the information.  
 
 It is also curious that, given the myriad properties of information, non-
                                                             
49 Thomas B. Nachbar, The Comedy of the Market, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 453 (2007). 
50  Coase, Ronald H. (1974), "The Lighthouse in Economics", Journal of Law and Economics 17 (2): 
357. 
 16 
excludability and non-rivalry have received so much attention.  One may be 
suspicious that the attention may be prompted by its neatness of fit into the 
pre-existing concept of a public good more than the underlying realities of 
what properties information holds.  In any event, it is worth suggesting that 
lawyers’ or economists’ understanding of information’s properties might be 
broader, and begin to draw less on just anecdotal examples, but some study of 
the science of information.  Indeed, it may turn out that information’s other 
properties, less studied, will be equally important for public policy.  
  
  Consider, for example, the question of what effect usage has on the 
market value of information.  While the question has not been well studied, 
two views are implied by the literature: namely the “overgrazing” view that 
information necessarily degrades or is tarnished by usage, and its rejoinder 
that usage cannot have any effect on the value of information.  Neither seems 
to be exactly correct, and the relationship between usage and value may in 
fact be more complicated than first appears.  
 
 It is interesting to notice that many suppliers in the information 
economy devote themselves to trying to convince the public to consume 
information, and will even sometimes pay them to do so.  The idea of the 
“attention economy” refers to concentrated efforts by suppliers not to avoid 
the usage of their information, but to encourage it to the broadest extent 
possible – captured by the desire to see information “go viral” and reach 
millions of users.  This is not a new phenomenon – record labels have long 
wanted their music to play on the radio, and have long been willing to pay 
radio stations to, in effect, give away their product for free.  If information 
were predictably subject to overgrazing, this would be a terrible idea; 
similarly, if information’s value could not possibly be affected by usage, why 
try so hard to get people to consume it? 
 
 One obvious explanation is that this is all advertising (itself not well 
understood).  Advertising, in John Kenneth Galbraith’s account, is a tool for 
creating demand, and by this theory the song is played to create demand for 
itself.51  But that doesn’t tell us enough:  advertising makes sense when it is 
for another product, and indeed the usual definition of the word “advertising” 
is to “call attention to goods for sale.”  It seems a different matter when 
information generates demand for itself, and therefore, by usage, increases 
its own value.  Watching the exploits of Iron Man on the screen or page may 
generate an insatiable appetite for more Iron Man.  By establishing itself in 
the minds of consumers in this way, information can become incredibly 
valuable, in part because it can then be used to draw consumers to still other 
objects by an attention merchant.52 
                                                             
51 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958) 
52 Cf. David S. Evans, Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms, University of Chicago Institute for 
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 A different theory suggests that we are approaching the problem 
incorrectly, for someone listening to a “free” song or watching a “free” video is 
actually paying for it, not in units of money, but in human attention, a highly 
scarce resource.  Deciding to spend time with any information should be seen 
as an expenditure, dissolving the apparent paradox. 
 
 In the law, trademark is best acquainted with this dynamic.  With its 
doctrines of blurring, tarnishment, and dilution, trademark seems to 
recognize that certain uses of information might reduce the value of 
information, or its reputation.  On the other hand, firms pay millions to have 
their brands announced during sporting events, or placed in Times Square to 
be consumed by millions without payment, or even to have the brand mocked 
or portrayed in strange circumstances, so long as there is exposure (consider 
the prominent role played by FedEx in the film Cast Away).  The result of 
such mass exposure is rarely degradation, but rather, the creation of brands, 
which are easily the most valuable form of intellectual property. 
 
 A final theory relies on the idea that a certain class of informational 
goods gets more valuable with usage. They are what Cass R. Sunstein and 
Edna Ullmann-Margalit call “solidarity goods”:  goods that increase in value 
with joint consumption.53  As the authors write, “Solidarity goods have more 
value to the extent that other people are enjoying them.”  While solidarity 
goods are not exclusively informational, many of Sunstein and Ullmann-
Margalit’s examples are forms of information. “The value of a magazine or 
television program focusing on a current topic (genetic engineering of food, for 
example) may increase significantly if many other people watch or read 
them.”  This suggests that, rather than trying to discourage usage of some 
information, the owner of the information has some incentive to increase 
consumption of the information in question and so as to maximize the value 
of the good.  
 
 The theory of solidarity goods also seems an incomplete explanation.  
It does not explain, for example, the intuition that a song may become more 
valuable by repeated play to even a single consumer, regardless of any group 
effects.  But, in any event, understanding these mechanisms is one of many 
ways we might better understand the information economy and its 
regulation.  It might entail trying to better understand the competition for 
cognitive space and attention that is so central to the information economy. 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 627. (2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2195340. 
53 Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Political Goods, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 129 (2001).  
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